Currently, Khaled [the guerilla] said he is responsible for "three or four" Fedayeen cells. He said they have been involved in carrying out attacks on U.S. troops in Fallujah and Baghdad with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns.
He said specialized cells have been created to deal with procuring weapons, developing more sophisticated bombs, identifying informers and creating systems of coded communication. These units, Khaled said, are small and do not know one another - a policy meant to reduce the potential for infiltration or arrests that lead the cells to unravel.
That strategy has been used by Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and by Algerian nationalists who fought a bloody war to drive France out of Algeria in the 1960s.
Hmmm....
UPDATE: Alert reader Harry Tuttle points to an article by Mohamad Bazzi of Newsday has an interesting interview with one of the Iraqi guerillas here (missed it in the "16 words" frenzy)
Currently, Khaled [the guerilla] said he is responsible for "three or four" Fedayeen cells. He said they have been involved in carrying out attacks on U.S. troops in Fallujah and Baghdad with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns.
He said specialized cells have been created to deal with procuring weapons, developing more sophisticated bombs, identifying informers and creating systems of coded communication. These units, Khaled said, are small and do not know one another - a policy meant to reduce the potential for infiltration or arrests that lead the cells to unravel.
That strategy has been used by Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and by Algerian nationalists who fought a bloody war to drive France out of Algeria in the 1960s.
Hmmm....
UPDATE: Alert reader Harry Tuttle points to an article by Salam Pax in The Guardian that vividly describes the difference between British and American approach to low intensity warfare.