Tuesday, April 18, 2006

The Consequences of the Tinkerbell Strategy

Since this nightmare began we have been told the criticism undermines the effort. The Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld strategy was to demand that we all clap louder while they ignored and dismissed any criticism.

As Ted Barlow provided for us on September 8, 2003:

Think of a wonderful thought…

From Donald Rumsfeld:

Mr. Rumsfeld did not mention any of the domestic critics by name. But he suggested that those who have been critical of the administration’s handling of the war in Iraq and its aftermath might be encouraging American foes to believe that the United States might one day walk away from the effort, as it has in past conflicts.

From Christopher Durang:

You remember how in the second act Tinkerbell drinks some poison that Peter is about to drink in order to save him? And then Peter turns to the audience and he says, “Tinkerbell is going to die because not enough people believe in fairies. But if all of you clap your hands real hard to show that you do believe in fairies, maybe she won’t die.”

So, we all started to clap. I clapped so long and so hard that my palms hurt and they even started to bleed I clapped so hard. Then suddenly the actress playing Peter Pan turned to the audience and she said, “That wasn’t enough. You did not clap hard enough. Tinkerbell is dead.” And then we all started to cry. The actress stomped off stage and refused to continue with the production. They finally had to lower the curtain. The ushers had to come help us out of the aisles and into the street.

You hear that? CLAP LOUDER!

The consequences have been catastrophic:

"The American politicians couldn't understand the deepness and complications of the region," said Falah al-Nakib, the interior minister from June 2004 to April 2005, who said he raised the militia problem and the growing Iranian influence in Iraq with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. "They didn't take us seriously."

U.S. officials long have known that the Shiite militias could become a problem.

Officials in Washington said alarms about the growing power of the militias began in late 2003 and were raised throughout 2004 and 2005 by a variety of agencies, including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Senior officials dismissed the reports as "nay-saying" and "hand-wringing," said two former senior officials in Washington who were responsible for Iraq policy through most or all of that period and one top official who remains in government.

The officials agreed to speak only on the condition of anonymity because they discussed intelligence reports that remain classified.